

RELATION OF CURRENT PLANS AND POSTURE TO PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS

1. Survival and endurance.

(a) The current force cannot survive in major strength under well-coordinated enemy attack without quick reaction to tactical warning which is ambiguous and unreliable. Only the small Polaris force can endure under prolonged attack, and no current protected capability exists to control it. (Airborne alert is a current potential, and preparation could extend the interval during which planes in the air on positive control could await commitment.)

(b) No current strategic plans provide for a strategic reserve under any circumstances of central war; all ready vehicles, including all Polaris missiles, are committed to attack pre-planned targets as soon as possible.

2. Strict positive control.

(a) There are currently no realistic procedures for the authorization of a strategic response by high national authority in the event of a surprise attack destroying Washington. All duly constituted officials authorized to assume succession as Commander-in-Chief are normally located in Washington. Even a moderate attack on the U.S. command and control system today would eliminate, with high confidence, the possibility of a U.S. authorized or even coordinated response.

(b) In the absence of realistic plans or convincing assurance that authorization for an appropriate response will be forthcoming, there is widespread acceptance of the notion that unauthorized "initiative" will be necessary, either at high military levels of command (which are almost as vulnerable as Washington) or at low. Both this attitude itself, and the reluctance to institute reliable safeguards against unauthorized action which follows from it, increase the possibility of unauthorized "initiative" in a time of crisis, under the stress of ambiguous indications and an outage of communications with higher command.

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It is not clear whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The evidence is circumstantial and does not directly prove the defendant's guilt. The defendant's defense is that the evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt. The court must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

6. The defendant is now blind.

[illegible]

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1. The first step in the process of identifying a potential security risk is to conduct a thorough review of the individual's background. This includes checking for any criminal history, previous employment, and other relevant information.

1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to define the problem. This involves identifying the symptoms of the problem and determining the scope of the problem. Once the problem has been defined, the next step is to identify the causes of the problem. This involves identifying the factors that are contributing to the problem and determining the root cause of the problem. Once the causes of the problem have been identified, the next step is to develop a plan to address the problem. This involves identifying the actions that need to be taken to address the problem and determining the resources that will be needed to implement the plan. Once a plan has been developed, the next step is to implement the plan. This involves taking the actions that have been identified in the plan and putting them into practice. Finally, the last step in the process is to evaluate the results of the plan. This involves determining whether the plan has been successful in addressing the problem and identifying any areas for improvement.

... and the ...

1. The Commission is of the opinion that the Commission should be authorized to conduct such investigations as may be necessary to determine the extent of the problem and to develop a program of action to deal with it.

...the

(c) Although there are physical safeguards against accident, there are almost none against unauthorized action, either in connection with individual vehicles or in command post operations. Such safeguards are technically possible; in principle, they take the form of a combination lock on weapons, requiring a code sent by higher authority to unsafely or release the weapon.

(d) Such safeguards are particularly important in connection with weapons under dual control with an Ally; current "protection", furnished by the Ally itself, serves to guard against "third party" action but furnishes minimum inhibition against unilateral action by Allied forces themselves.

(e) "Super-safing" both against accident and unauthorized action is required for weapons on high alert or mobile. Currently, weapons on high alert with Allied forces, nominally under dual control, not only lack such special precautions but are atypically accident-prone, not having been designed for such operation.

(f) It would be unacceptable to lower the risk of accident at the cost of markedly raising the risk of deliberate enemy attack; solutions to the problems of accident and unauthorized action should not afford an enemy the opportunity to paralyze U.S. response totally by attack on the command and control system. Although the design of explicit procedures for authorization under all circumstances raises complicated issues, such procedures could be both safer and more reliable than current tacit, ambiguous and uncontrolled understandings.

3. Information

(a) Current plans (prior to the President's Budget Message) do not call for bomb alarm read-outs at offensive force bases or subordinate command posts. Many units, particularly outside the ZI, might have outage of communications as their only immediate indication of enemy attack, and that would be highly ambiguous.

(b) The current design of the bomb alarm system, including means of transmission of signals, is such that a small number of bombs might put it out of operation. Thus, even though it had indicated that an attack involving "at least," say, four

100. The first of these was the fact that the Commission had been established by the President in 1954, and that it had been given the task of investigating the activities of the Communist Party in the United States. The Commission had been given the task of investigating the activities of the Communist Party in the United States, and it had been given the task of investigating the activities of the Communist Party in the United States.

1. The first of these is the fact that the Commission has not yet received any information from the Government of the United States regarding the activities of the Committee for the Liberation of the Americas (CLA) in the United States. The Commission is therefore unable to determine whether the CLA is active in the United States or not.

SECRET